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ABSTRACT
Soil conditions and site effects play an important role in the vulnerability assessment of lifelines and infrastructures under strong
seismic excitation. Due to the spatial extent of these networks, they are subjected to non-uniform and incoherent ground motion as a
result of the variability of soil and geological conditions; consequently their vulnerability assessment depends entirely on the
variability of soil conditions and ground motion, known as site effects, for a given seismic scenario. Fragility functions for the
exposed elements at risk, composing the different lifelines and infrastructure systems, play an equally important role. The paper
presents some selected results of a recent application of a comprehensive methodology assessing the vulnerability of several lifeline
systems in Thessaloniki in Greece. The work is part of a large research program, aiming to the development of a general methodology
for the assessment of the seismic risk for the building stock, lifeline systems and infrastructures at urban scale. Key factors of the
methodology are the inventory, the typology, the specific characteristics and the importance (global value) of the elements at risk, the
development of seismic scenarios (seismic hazard) and the geotechnical characterization, with the detailed site response analysis. The
methodology and the role of soil and site conditions are highlighted with representative examples of the application in Thessaloniki.

INTRODUCTION
Modern societies are relied on complex networks of lifelines,
utilities and infrastructures. They are the basic installations
and facilities on which the continuance and growth of a
community depends. The uncertainties due to the spatial
variability of the networks, the incomplete inventory data, the
lack of well-validated damage data from past strong
earthquakes and the uniform definition of damage states
makes the vulnerability assessment of each particular
component and of the network as a whole, a very difficult
task.
Herein, a methodology for the seismic risk analysis of
infrastructures is presented based on a detailed site response
analysis with an application to Thessaloniki’s Metropolitan
area. The significant role of a well-documented study of the
seismicity, surface geology, topography, local soil conditions
and characteristics, is reflecting in the reliable estimation of
the ground motion.
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Furthermore, adequate loss scenarios are generated taking into
consideration the individual characteristics of the elements at
risk, the typology and the vulnerability, as well as the seismic
hazard, geotechnical characterization and site response of the
main soil formations for different seismic scenarios.
Moreover, taking into account the functional and social
vulnerability of lifeline elements through a global value
analysis, lifeline networks can be analyzed as an integrated
part of the selected seismic risk scenario and as a part of the
urban system, considering human, material and immaterial
assets. Thus, a prioritization of pre-earthquake retrofitting
actions and quantification of the overall importance of
different complex and coupled lifeline systems could be
performed. Representative examples are given for different
steps of the risk analysis.
The work reported in the paper is part of the national research
project SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) in which several partners
from University, public authorities, local municipalities and
organizations managing/owning lifelines were participated.
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METHODOLOGY
The general framework of the methodology developed for the
vulnerability assessment and seismic risk management of
utility networks (potable water, waste-water, gas, electric
power, telecommunication, fire-fighting), transportation
systems (roadway, railway, airport, port) and critical facilities
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Loss estimates including direct and
indirect losses, depend on the existing inventory and typology
classification of the elements at risk, the vulnerability models
and the existing interactions between lifeline components.
Inventory is an essential step to identify, characterize and
classify all types of lifeline elements according to their
specific typology and their distinctive geometric, structural
and functional features. Geographical information systems
(GIS) offer the perfect platform to implement any inventory
inquires. Within this context, earthquake damage is directly
related to structural properties of lifeline elements. Typology
is thus a fundamental descriptor of a system, derived from the
inventory of each element at risk. The level of seismic input
motion is defined on the basis of site specific ground response
analysis for several probabilities of exceedance. Selection of
input motion parameters (i.e. spectral values) estimated from
seismic codes prescriptions is a wrong procedure for reasons
that are explained throughout this paper. The vulnerability
assessment deals mainly with the quantification of damage of
each element at risk, using appropriate fragility functions.
Furthermore, a “global value analysis” of the elements at risk
is proposed, taking into account different criteria such as the
functional relations between them and the urban activities and
relations of lifelines with the surrounding urban or rural
environment. “Global value analysis” aims to the definition of
lifeline’s importance and role in the urban environment in
three periods of urban functioning (normal, crisis, recovery) in
respect to the occurrence of an earthquake event. Combining
the vulnerability assessment with the importance of different
elements in pre and post seismic periods, a rigorous disaster
management process including mitigation, preparedness,
response and recovery actions could be assigned. An
important step for the implementation of an “efficient
mitigation strategy” includes a simplified or a more advanced
reliability analysis of the damaged and the undamaged system
in order to estimate the level of the remaining serviceability of
the system which is closely connected with the functionality of
the community.
SEISMIC SCENARIOS – SITE SPECIFIC GROUND
RESPONSE ANALYSIS
Seismic hazard for the vulnerability analysis and risk
assessment of lifelines, utilities and infrastructures, should be
specified according to the precise needs for the particular
lifeline components and networks, as well as the most
adequate models used to describe vulnerability and fragility
relationships. Moreover due to the spatial extent of lifeline
systems, spatial variability of ground motion considering the
local soil conditions is of great importance (Pitilakis et al.
2005).
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Fig. 1. Flowchart of the methodology (Pitilakis et al. 2005).
Specific geotechnical-surface geology information is required,
and adequate studies should be performed to estimate the
necessary ground shaking parameters, in terms of seismic
scenarios with different mean return periods. These studies are
conventionally referred as “microzonation studies”. In
Thessaloniki, a detailed microzonation study has been
conducted for three different mean return periods of
approximately Tm=100, 475 and 1000 years. The study is
based on the results of a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis
using recent data regarding the seismicity, the corresponding
seismic zones and the seismic faults in the greater area
(RISKUE, 2001-2004, SRMLIFE, 2003-2007). A detailed
model of the surface geology and geotechnical characteristics,
for site effect studies, was generated for the city of
Thessaloniki. The resulted geotechnical map (Anastasiadis et
al. 2001) was based on numerous data provided by
geotechnical
investigations,
geophysical
surveys,
microtremors measurements, classical geotechnical and
special soil dynamic tests (Pitilakis et al. 1992, Pitilakis and
Anastasiadis 1998, Raptakis et al. 1994a, Raptakis et al.
1994b, Raptakis 1995, Apostolidis et al. 2004). The dynamic
properties of the main soil formations have been defined from
an extended laboratory testing including resonant column and
cyclic triaxial tests (Pitilakis et al. 1992, Pitilakis and
Anastasiadis 1998, Anastasiadis 1994).
Site effects are calculated performing a great number of 1D
linear equivalent response analyses, and few 2D analysis in
selected cross sections, in order to take into account the
influence of geotechnical characteristics and dynamic
properties of the main soil formations, on expected seismic
ground motion. The analysis is conducted for five different
scaled real accelerograms (for bed rock motions), which were
selected according to the seismic hazard study, for three
scenarios (mean recurrence period of 100, 475 and 1000
years) (Papaioannou 2004).
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Fig. 3. Distribution of the mean values of “peak” permanent
ground settlements due to liquefaction - Δv(cm) for the 475
years seismic scenario.
Advanced seismic risk analysis study requires maps with the
spatial distribution of strong motion parameters (e.g. PGA,
PGV, PGD) in the study area. As an example, the
characteristics of the calculated seismic ground motions at the
free surface, in terms of peak acceleration (PGA) and velocity
(PGV) are presented in Fig. 2 for the earthquake scenario with
10% probability of exceedance in 50 years (mean return
period of 475 years). Similar maps have been generated for all
seismic scenarios, and for several other ground motion
parameters (i.e. ground strains, response spectra, etc).

b)

Finally, in order to account for the liquefaction-induced
phenomena, the evaluation of permanent ground horizontal
and vertical displacements, (lateral spreading and settlements),
has been performed for the three scenarios using empirical and
analytical procedures (Seed et al. 2003, Youd et al. 2001, EC8,
Ishihara and Yoshimine 1992, Elgamal et al. 2001). Figure 3
illustrates the spatial distribution of permanent ground
settlements for the 475 years scenario.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of mean peak ground acceleration (PGA:
g’s) (a) and mean peak ground velocity (PGV: cm/s) (b)
obtained by 1D (EQL) analytical approach for the 475 years
seismic scenario.
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PGA values are varying from 0.15g to 0.55g while, if the
whole analysis was based on the Hellenic seismic code, the
design PGA should be equal only to 0.16g! Site effects play a
crucial role and, with respect to the spatial variability and
typology of various assets, their spatial variability may change
completely the intensity and spatial variability of damages and
losses. The simple use of seismic code soil classification
schemes, and associated design acceleration values, is
completely inadequate for a “high technology” vulnerability
analysis and risk assessment.
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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND LOSS
SCENARIOS
A fundamental requirement for assessing the seismic
performance of a system is the ability to quantify correctly the
damages related to the level of seismic hazard intensity, and of
course the typology of each component and system. In
general, vulnerability functions, are deterministic, statistical or
probabilistic relationships between the component’s damage
state, functionality, economic losses etc, and an appropriate
measure of the intensity of the earthquake hazard. Besides the
great inherent uncertainties, the key assumption in the
vulnerability assessment of lifeline and utility systems, is that
structures having similar structural characteristics, being in
similar geotechnical conditions, are expected to perform in the
same way for a given seismic loading (source and path effects
are excluded). Thus, the respective fragility functions should
be defined on the basis of the typological characteristics of the
elements at risk, taking also into consideration specific
construction practices and distinctive features affecting their
seismic behavior.
In Thessaloniki, the assessment of potential earthquake losses
is performed for utility systems (potable water, fire-fighting,
waste-water, gas, telecommunication, electric power) and
transportation systems (roadways, railways, airport, port), as
well as for other critical facilities (hospitals, schools), based
on the results from the detailed microzonation study, for the
three selected scenarios with mean return periods Tm=100,
475 and 1000 years. Thus, these loss scenarios are constructed
on the basis of site specific seismic hazard analysis using
available inventory data and adequate fragility curves. In the
following some representative examples of vulnerability
assessment are given for water, road and port systems.

elements and Greek practice. Figure 4 presents the spatial
distribution and the intensity of the estimated damages for the
475 years scenario. The number, the intensity and the location
of the damages are related to the spatial distribution of seismic
ground motion for the specific scenario, and the individual
characteristics of the examined elements.
About 1.4% of the potable water system of Thessaloniki is
anticipated to experience leaks and about 4.1% breaks for the
475 years scenario. A total number of 79 leaks and 224 breaks
are expected in the principle water pipeline network. Two (2)
of the total forty-three (43) water tanks, are estimated to have
moderate or extensive damages for the above scenario. A
significant number of water pumping stations, about 82%, is
expected to present small to moderate damages. The rest 18%
of the pumping stations will experience extensive failures that
can lead to malfunction, and in some cases even in loss of
water serviceability in major areas of the city. It must be
mentioned that the majority of the anticipated damages in
water pipes across the coastline are attributed to the
occurrence of liquefaction induced phenomena (settlements).
For the pumping stations and tanks, damages are attributed to
the specific ground motion characteristics related to local soil
conditions.

Potable water system
Thessaloniki’s principle potable water system is comprised of
about 1351 km of pipes. The current inventory database
includes several attributes such as location, diameter, material,
age, operating area, supplied tank, type, depth, length, joint
type and history of failures, where these data are available.
The vulnerability assessment of potable water pipes is based
on the estimation of the expected Repair Rate per pipe km
(RR/km). Expected damages (leaks and/or breaks) caused by
wave propagation are estimated using O’ Rourke and Ayala
(1993) fragility relation proposed by HAZUS (NIBS 2004),
where the seismic loading is described in terms of peak
ground velocity (PGV). The expected damages due to ground
failure, expressed in terms of ground settlements, are assessed
based on the Honegger and Eguchi (1992) fragility relation.
Prior to their application in Thessaloniki, these empirical
vulnerability functions have been validated with well
documented data, from recent earthquakes in Lefkas-Greece,
2003, and in Düzce-Turkey, 1999 (Alexoudi 2005).
Appropriate fragility curves for tanks and pumping stations
are also selected from HAZUS (NIBS 2004), after adequate
elaboration of the structural characteristics of the exposed
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Fig. 4. Vulnerability assessment and damage distribution of
Thessaloniki’s water system (Tm=475 years)
Roadway system
The inventory for the roadway network in the metropolitan
area of Thessaloniki includes about 600 km of road-lines and
80 bridges. The roadway system is rather insufficient,
especially in the centre, where the densely built up area creates
a complex network, with narrow streets and inadequate
parking areas. Roads are classified in freeways, major and
secondary arterials, primary and secondary collectives, based
on their geometry and functional role in the network. The
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majority of bridges are in the ring road and the main exits of
the city. Their classification is based on the number of spans
(single or multiple), the design seismic code level (low or
upgraded), the pier type (single or multiple columns) and the
span continuity (continuous or simple support). The
vulnerability analysis of the network includes the estimation
of direct losses such as bridge and road damage due to ground
shaking or ground failure, and indirect such as street
blockades, due to debris of collapsed buildings.
The expected level of damages for bridges is assessed based
on the fragility curves that are provided in HAZUS (NIBS
2004), for the input earthquake hazard scenario and the
estimated mean spectral acceleration at T=1.0sec. The
estimated damage state for each bridge for the 475 years
seismic scenario, is presented in Fig. 5. The majority of
bridges will respond in a satisfactory way, but there are still
few bridges, which are expected to sustain serious damage for
the specific seismic hazard scenario. This is due to the higher
vulnerability of these bridges (single column, simple support
bridges and inadequate seismic design), and the higher values
of the expected surface spectral acceleration. The latter is
attributed to the local soil conditions and the proximity of the
seismic source (ex. southeast part). For instance, in the west
part of the city, deep soft alluvium deposits of sandy-silty
clays to clayey sands-silts, with low strength and high
compressibility, (category C and D in EC8), present stronger
amplification at longer periods.

For the functionality of roads just after the earthquake a
correlation between the building’s height (i.e. number of
storeys) and the width of the induced debris is used, in order to
estimate the impact of collapsed buildings. The spatial
distribution of the collapsed or heavily damaged buildings is
again depending on their typology and the site conditions. A
Gaussian distribution describes the variation of the debris
width, which is a function of the building collapse angle ()
and the building volume reduction (kv) (Fig. 6). This model is
used in order to estimate the exceedance probability of certain
road function levels (100% open, 50% open, 0% closed or one
lane open). The collapse probability of buildings is estimated
based on appropriate fragility models which have been
developed for the building types commonly presented in
Thessaloniki, as a function of the peak ground acceleration
(Kappos et al. 2006, Penelis et al. 2002).
Past experience in Greece reveals that a percentage of
collapses ranging between 10 and 20% can have such form
and amount of debris, which can result to road closure. The
probability of closure due to building collapse is calculated
based on the combination of the aforementioned probabilities
for each road segment (node to node). Figure 7 illustrates the
probability of closure for the main roads in the central city due
to building collapses for the scenario with a mean return
period 1000 years. The reduction of the road width depends on
the distance from the buildings, the width of the road and the
induced debris width, while the closure probabilities depends
on the concentration of the most vulnerable building type, the
length of the road segment and the discrete collapse
probabilities related to the local site conditions.
Wd  W 2 

2  kv W  H



W
L

W

Wt= total road width
Weff= effective road width
Wbr= distance between building façade and road
Wd= width of debris
Wcl= closed road width
Wfr= free road width
H= height of building
W= width of building
kv= building volume reduction
φ= angle of collapse

Wd
H

φ

Wt
Wbr

Wfr

Wcl
Weff

Fig. 6. Estimation of debris width and road closure.
Fig. 5. Distribution of expected damages to roadway bridges
of Thessaloniki for the 475 years seismic scenario.
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facilities. Indirect damages can be particularly important in
complex systems such as port facilities. A representative
example is the Port of Kobe (Japan) that suffered severe
damage during the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake; the port
was essentially shut down and required over two years to fully
repair. Indirect financial losses were profound due to the
“permanent” loss of the diverted traffic during the
reconstruction phase (Chang 2000).
Loss estimations are performed for the port facilities utility
networks, transportation systems and buildings of
Thessaloniki’s Port based on the results of the site specific
(microzonation) study for the three seismic scenarios (Tm=
100, 475 and 1000 years). The soil conditions are quite poor
dominated by soft – loose alluvial deposits at great depth. In
each particular system, adequate fragility curves and/or
vulnerability relationships were used, based on the specific
features and typology of the considered elements at risk. The
type, extent and spatial distribution of induced earthquake
damage were specified and illustrated in GIS thematic maps.
In the following, some examples of the vulnerability
assessment and estimated direct damages of port facilities
(waterfront structures, cargo and handling equipment), potable
water system, electric power system and building structures of
Thessaloniki’s port are provided for selected seismic
scenarios.

Fig. 7. Sample map with probabilities for 50% road width
closure of the main road network due to building collapses
for the 1000 years seismic scenario.
Port system
The Port of Thessaloniki covers an area of 1,500,000 m2 and
trades approximately 15,000,000 tons of cargo annually,
having a capacity of 200,000 containers and 6 piers with
6,500m length. In collaboration with the port authority
(Thessaloniki Port Authority, THPA), various data was
collected and implemented in GIS format for the construction,
typological and functional characteristics of the considered
elements at risk, including cargo and handling equipment,
waterfront structures, electric power (transmission and
distribution lines, substations), potable and waste water
(pipelines), telecommunication (lines and stations), railway
(tracks) and roadway (roads and bridge) systems as well as
buildings and critical facilities. The presence of all the above
utilities and infrastructures in a limited area enables the
complete application of the methodology for the seismic risk
assessment of lifelines-infrastructures and the specification of
possible weak or critical points for the operation of the whole
system.
Loss assessment for a given seismic scenario refers to direct
damages and indirect effects due to loss of functionality of
lifeline components, networks and infrastructures inside port
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Waterfront structures, cargo and handling equipment. The
inventory developed for the waterfront structures includes
several attributes such as name, location, operational depth
(m), year of construction, equipment, material, type,
foundation type, maintenance, damages in previous
earthquakes and length (m). Empirical vulnerability functions
for gravity waterfront structures (HAZUS, NIBS 2004), have
been validated prior to their application, using data from
recent European earthquakes (i.e. Lefkas, 2003, Kakderi et al.
2006). Ground shaking parameters and permanent ground
displacement due to liquefaction are the input parameters
describing the intensity of seismic hazard. For cranes and
cargo handling equipment the available inventory data include
their type, capacity (t), working range (m), year of
construction, source, location, anchorage, type of cargo and
energy, alternative energy sources, maintenance and damages
in previous earthquakes.
Figure 8 presents the results of the vulnerability assessment
(estimated worst probable damage state, i.e. exceeding
probability >50%) for the waterfront structures and cargo
handling equipment for the 475 years scenario. The majority
of the waterfront structures (63%) is expected to remain
practically undamaged for the referred seismic scenario, while
the rest 37% will have only minor to slight damages. The
damage states have been considered according to HAZUS
(NIBS 2004). However, moderate level damages are expected
for 42 out of the 49 elements of cargo handling equipment due
to their sensibility in differential ground settlements. In both
cases the anticipated damages are attributed mainly to the
occurrence of liquefaction induced phenomena.
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are medium voltage (20kV-400V) substations with unanchored components. For the electric lines, the inventory
includes attributes such as length, voltage, type, depth, age,
material, and foundation type.

Fig.8. Distribution of damages to waterfront structures and
cargo handling equipment of Thessaloniki’s Port
(Tm=475 years).
Utilities: Water and electric power supply systems. Figure 9
presents the spatial distribution and the intensity of estimated
damages for the water supply network within the port area for
the 1000 years scenario. Their number, intensity and location
are related to the spatial distribution of seismic ground motion
(velocity and strains), for the specific scenario as well as the
individual characteristics of the examined elements. Also in
this particular case, the occurrence of liquefaction induced
phenomena is the determinant factor of the pipelines’
anticipated seismic performance, in all three seismic scenarios.

Given the fact that the available fragility curves for electric
power substations refer to higher voltage elements, with
different designing and functional characteristics, they cannot
be directly applied herein. Thus a preliminary estimation of
induced seismic damage for the three scenarios has been
performed using the vulnerability functions proposed by
HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) for low voltage (115kv) substations
with non-anchored components (conservative approach
considering the increase of the damage possibility for higher
voltage elements). Fragility curves that are provided by
HAZUS (NIBS 2004) were also used for the vulnerability
assessment of the electric lines, using the spatial distribution
of peak ground acceleration (PGA) values for the three
seismic scenarios. Figure 10 presents the spatial distribution
and the intensity of estimated damages for the electric power
system for the 1000 years scenario. The majority of the
elements estimated to sustain moderate to extensive damages.

Fig.10. Distribution of damages to electric power system of
Thessaloniki’s Port (Tm=1000 years).

Fig.9. Distribution of damages to water pipelines of
Thessaloniki’s Port (Tm=1000 years).
The electric power system of Thessaloniki’s port includes
transmission and distribution lines (13.6Km length), electric
power generators for serving the critical facilities in case of
loss of power supply and open and closed type substations.
The current inventory database for the substations includes
several typological and functional attributes, such as name,
power of transformers, voltage, service area, equipment
anchorage, loop connection, functional control form another
substation, type of transformers, number of transformers, type
of substation and supply type. Inside the port facilities are
located 17 electric power substations; 13 elements cover the
power demand of the port facilities and 4 substations serve
external needs but are located inside the port territory; they all
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Buildings: Buildings in a port system include administration
and control buildings, traffic control buildings, passenger
terminals, offices, security and maintenance buildings, sheds
and warehouses and other critical facilities. Furthermore,
buildings within lifelines systems and infrastructures are also
considered (e.g. pumping stations, engine-houses, electric
power substations, etc). Thessaloniki’s port includes 88
elements of this type. Their typology was defined based on the
construction material, structural type, height and seismic
design code level.
The vulnerability analysis of R/C buildings is performed based
on fragility curves (in terms of PGA) that have been
developed using a hybrid technique combining analytical
results and statistical data (Kappos et al. 2006). Six damage
states (DS) are defined, the names of which have been slightly
modified in order to be compatible with other lifeline elements
damage definitions: no damage (DS0), minor (DS1), slight
(DS2), moderate (DS3), extensive (DS4) and complete (DS5).
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Moreover, fragility curves (in terms of both PGA and Sd) for
masonry structures that were developed for all typologies
common in Greece were used in the present application
(Penelis et al. 2002). Vulnerability assessment for the three
seismic scenarios has been performed, using a reduction factor
of 0.7 for the conversion of peak to effective values of ground
acceleration. The distribution of estimated damages for the
port building for the 475 years scenario is illustrated in Fig.
11. 27%, 64% and 9% are estimated to sustain minor, slight
and complete damages respectively.

Fig.11. Distribution of damages to building structures of
Thessaloniki’s port (Tm=475 years).

have different indicators depending on their relative
importance in the crisis management process. Representative
GIS maps illustrating the definition of main, important and
secondary elements at risk can also be constructed (Figs. 12,
13).
Table 1. Indicators used for the global value analysis and
classification of importance of cargo handling equipment
seismic of Thessaloniki port.
Cargo handling equipment
Period
Nor- Cri RecoCompoIndicators
Description
mal -sis very
nents
Lifting capacity
Operation 1.Capacity



in tons.
Location / dockOperation 2.Location



pier located
Type of cargo
that can be
3.Cargo
Operation
handled



capacity
(conventional,
containers)
Alternative
4.Redun- equipment to
Operation


dancy
cover the
activity.

GLOBAL VALUE ANALYSIS
The aim of the global value analysis is to identify the main
issues and relative importance of each lifeline network,
through appropriate ranking of the value of the exposed
elements, based on various factors that describe the role of
each element in the urban system. In that way, the global value
of each element at risk, depends not only on its direct specific
value or content (physical and human), but also upon its
indirect/immaterial value, that is represented by the usefulness
and relative role in the whole urban system, at a specific time.
Three periods are identified in respect to the occurrence of an
earthquake event: normal, crisis and recovery. “Global value”
evaluation in different periods could be a powerful tool for the
prioritization of pre-earthquake actions and quantification of
the overall importance of different complex and coupled
lifeline systems. Several criteria for this are used, such as
operational attributes, land use, population influenced, human
losses, economic and social weight under normal, crisis and
recovery circumstances, identity/ radiance, environmental
impact and other. Appropriate qualitative or quantitative
indicators can then be defined for each period, while relevant
measuring units are used for their evaluation and the
identification of “main”, “important” and “secondary”
elements and system’s weak points. An example of the
indicators used for the classification of the importance of
Thessaloniki’s port cargo handling equipment is provided in
Table 1. Cargo handling operation during crisis and after that,
is crucial for the successful recovery reaction and resilience
following a major earthquake event. Other elements at risk
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Fig.12. Classification of the importance of cargo handling
equipment of Thessaloniki’s port during the crisis period.

Fig.13. Classification of the importance of waterfront
structures of Thessaloniki’s port during the crisis period.
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SEISMIC RISK MANAGEMENT
The pre-earthquake mitigation plans must be based on
appropriate prioritization criteria that combine engineering
techniques, economic analysis tools and decision-making or
political aspects. The identification of “main”, “important”
and “secondary” element at risk in “normal” period provides a
prioritization according to the importance of the activities, the
social and economical values and the daily demand for
serviceability.
A disaster management plan can enhance the pre-earthquake
activities for retrofitting (or strengthening), important and
critical components in the urban environment and prepare an
efficient organization of public services and local authorities
for “crisis” period. For the “recovery” period an efficient
management plan must minimize the restoration time, the
efforts and the cost. In order to achieve reliable estimates of
the required time for recovery, lifeline owing and operating
companies, local actors in collaboration should define
restoration curves for every component in each lifeline system,
with lifelines experts using basically qualitative evaluations.

cargo handling equipment 90 days after the seismic event,
supposing that the restoration process starts immediately after
the earthquake.

Fig.14. Restoration priorities of cargo handling equipment of
Thessaloniki’s Port during the crisis period (Tm=475 years).

The method we developed applying the “global value”
approach uses the classification of lifeline system components
into main, important and secondary, according to their global
value. Combining “global value” evaluation and vulnerability
assessment, it is possible, using, if necessary, an “expert
opinion” as well, to estimate priorities and to account for the
economic and social losses, for a specific utility system and a
given seismic scenario. Recovery activities could also follow
these priorities aiming at efficient seismic risk management
procedures.
Table 2 summarizes the application of the proposed
methodology in a simple system like the cargo handling
equipment of Thessaloniki’s port. Figure 14 illustrates the
restoration priorities defined for the same cargo handling
equipment during the crisis period, for the 475 years scenario.
Table 2. Risk analysis matrix showing cargo handling
equipment seismic retrofit priorities.
Priorities
Urban Risk/ Seismic
hazard
Main
Important
Complete/ Extensive
1st priority 1st priority
damages
Moderate damages 1st priority 2nd priority
Slight/ minor damages 1st priority 2nd priority

Secondary
2nd priority
3rd priority
4th priority

Restoration curves have been defined in collaboration with the
port authority, based on available man power, and capabilities,
local experience and expertise. Assuming that there are only
two available teams that could work together, the time
requested for the full recovery of all damaged equipment for
the 475 years scenario reaches the 6 years, which of course is
completely unacceptable, leading to a an obvious ex-ante
policy decision. Figure 15 illustrates the functionality level of
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Fig.15. Functionality percentage of cargo handling equipment
of Thessaloniki’s port in three months time (90 days) after the
seismic event (Tm=475 years).
CONCLUSIONS
A short description and an application of a general
methodology for the vulnerability assessment and seismic risk
management of lifelines and infrastructures, is presented; the
city of Thessaloniki in Greece has been used as test site.
Seismic risk scenarios take into consideration the inventory,
the typology and vulnerability characteristics of different
elements at risk, as well as the seismic hazard, geotechnical
characterization and site response of the main soil formations
for different seismic scenarios. Thus, vulnerability and loss
estimates for lifelines and infrastructures are evaluated on the
basis of site specific seismic hazard analysis using available
inventory data and adequate fragility curves. Local site
conditions and specific seismic ground response,
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conventionally referred as “zoning study”, plays the key role
in the vulnerability analysis and loss assessment.
Herein, a very short presentation of the site characterization
and seismic zonation for the city of Thessaloniki is presented.
A detailed microzonation study has been conducted for three
mean return periods (Tm=100, 475 and 1000 years). Based on
these results, examples of the assessment of potential
earthquake losses are presented for selected lifeline and utility
systems i.e. the water roadway and port system of
Thessaloniki. The intensity and spatial variability of the losses
are entirely relied on the specific ground response
characteristics.
On the basis of a global value analysis (material and
immaterial) of lifeline, utility and infrastructure elements, the
classification of their importance in different periods is
performed. This leads in a prioritization, in a more efficient
way, of the pre-earthquake retrofitting actions, and post
earthquake restoration efforts. Pre-earthquake mitigation
actions could include upgrading of structural performance of
lifeline components, improvement of the network
performance,
organization
of
redundant
systems,
implementation of advanced technologies during earthquake
emergency (early warning systems, real time damage
estimation etc). Furthermore, efficient disaster management
plans aiming at the minimization of the restoration time, the
efforts and the cost, could be implemented. An example of a
global value analysis, determination of priorities and
estimation of the recovery time are presented for the cargo
handling equipment of Thessaloniki’s Port and for the 475
years scenario.
Finally, based on the previous applications, the importance of
site-specific seismic response analysis is revealed for the
vulnerability assessment and the definition of efficient
mitigation strategies and policies for pre and post earthquake
actions. The actual vulnerability and the associated risk of any
element at risk may be reduced with appropriate mitigation
countermeasures. The accurate evaluation of the input motion
in terms of ground shaking characteristics, for a given
probability of occurrence of a specific magnitude seismic
event, always plays the decisive role in the risk assessment.
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